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Abstract and Keywords
As an analytical approach, the political economy of health “requires attention to the polit­
ical and economic structures, processes and power relationships that produce” distribu­
tions of health and illness, in the words of epidemiologist Nancy Krieger. This chapter 
demonstrates the value of this approach with reference to domestic and global cases and 
is organized around three key messages. First, public finance is a public health issue. Se­
cond, the transnational corporate role in the spread of disease must be taken into ac­
count in public health ethics. Third, ethics and politics cannot be separated in public 
health. The chapter concludes with three challenges for building a public health ethics 
that “speaks truth about power” in an increasingly inhospitable policy environment.
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(p. 842) Introduction: The Political Economy of 
Health
AS an analytical approach, the political economy of health is best described by the icono­
clastic epidemiologist Nancy Krieger: “[A]nalysis of causes of disease distribution re­
quires attention to the political and economic structures, processes and power relation­
ships that produce societal patterns of health, disease, and wellbeing via shaping the con­
ditions in which people live and work” (Krieger, 2011, 168, emphasis in original; see also 
Birn, Pillay, and Holtz, 2017, 92–95 and chapter 7). As an illustration of the value that this 
perspective can add to public health ethics, consider Lisa Lee’s (2017) identification of 
the Flint, Michigan, lead poisoning crisis (Bosman, 2016; Carmody, 2016; Osnos, 2016; 
Bosman, 2017) as a case study in the need for an integrative, multidisciplinary health 
ethics that incorporates public health and environment as well as the more familiar con­
cerns of bio(medical) ethics.
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Lee (2017, 6) argues, correctly, that “[a]n attempt to solve one problem by removing bac­
teria from the polluted Flint River to make it potable resulted in another—the poisoning 
of the economically underserved community of Flint.” She does not, however, pursue such 
questions as why the community is economically underserved—a mode of inquiry that 
would include the history of deindustrialization in a once prosperous manufacturing cen­
ter; racial segregation (Flint’s population is now predominantly African American); and, 
more proximally, a program of shrinking public sector services and budgets that had been 
actively promoted by a variety of neoliberal think tanks (p. 843) (MacLean, 2017, 213–215; 
MacLean’s book, and much of the recent scholarship she cites, are essential reading for 
anyone wishing to take seriously the political economy of public health, especially in the 
US context).
The Flint case shows that the production of patterns of health and illness to which 
Krieger refers is more than a metaphor. For an example in the global frame of reference, 
a history dating back to circa 1980 connects structural adjustment conditionalities de­
manded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in return for loans to 
support a restructuring of countries’ external debts with rising inequality and destructive 
effects on health systems and social determinants of health (Kentikelenis, 2017). Several 
observers have connected the debilitating effects on national health systems of these con­
ditionalities with the rapid spread of the Ebola outbreak in several African countries in 
2014 (Rowden, 2014; Kentikelenis et al., 2015; Sanders, Sengupta, and Scott, 2015). 
Commentators differ about the motivations of those promoting such conditionalities; com­
pare, for example, the view of the historian Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2007, 44), writing 
specifically about sub-Saharan Africa, that “the goal was to debilitate the institutions and 
strategies that had thus far enabled the survival and prosperity of local elites and provid­
ed the structure for existing, if no longer viable, patronage systems” with the generic con­
clusion of a multidisciplinary panel of social scientists examining the prospects for “sus­
tainable democracy” that “[a]n alliance of the international financial institutions, the pri­
vate banks, and the Thatcher-Reagan-Kohl governments was willing to use its political 
and ideological power to back its ideological predilections” (Przeworski et al., 1995, 5), 
Whatever the operative motivations, the health consequences of structural adjustment 
show that understanding the relevant historical processes, institutional structures, and 
macro-scale policies is a prerequisite for intellectually responsible discussions of public 
health ethics.
Against this background, the chapter is organized around three core messages. First, and 
most fundamentally, public finance is a public health issue. Second, the transnational cor­
porate role in the spread of disease, and the associated “power asymmetries” (Ottersen et 
al., 2014), must be taken into account in public health ethics. Third, these two observa­
tions (and others) indicate the inseparability of ethics and politics in public health. After 
an explication of these points, the chapter concludes with three challenges for building a 
public health ethics that “speaks truth about power” in an increasingly inhospitable poli­
cy environment.
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Public Finance and Public Health Ethics
In the context of recent programs of fiscal austerity, in the United Kingdom in the first in­
stance, the editor of The Lancet noted: “What is promoted as fiscal discipline is a political 
choice. A political choice that deepens the already open and bloody wounds of the poor 
and precarious” (Horton, 2017, 110). The choice does not, in fact, reflect any underlying 
(p. 844) economic necessity (Krugman, 2015), but rather a judgment about the relative 
value attached to protecting the lives and wealth of differently situated members of a so­
ciety (Basu, Carney, and Kenworthy, 2017). Post-2010, a Conservative-led government ex­
panded the Thatcher-era project of neoliberalization (Ward and England, 2007) by way of 
selective expenditure cutbacks that were, at this writing, on track to reduce the public 
sector’s share of the economy to pre–World War II levels—that is, to levels that predate 
the establishment of the National Health Service and the institutions of the postwar wel­
fare state (Johnson, 2014). A senior social policy scholar observed that this amounted to a 
“root and branch restructuring” of the United Kingdom’s economy and society, of which 
“[t]he longer-term goal is to shrink the state, free the market and set British political 
economy on a new course” (Taylor-Gooby, 2012, 61). The cuts fell most heavily not only on 
the most vulnerable people but also on the poorest local economies (as summarized by 
Schrecker, 2017), which were already among the poorest regions in northern Europe (Eu­
rostat, 2014). Notably, cutbacks in benefit levels and an aggressive and often capricious 
regime of benefit “sanctioning” (actual or threatened cutoffs) have been linked to rapid 
increases in reliance on charity food banks (Garthwaite, 2016), and—in both epidemiolog­
ical studies and Parliamentary committee testimony—a rise in the prevalence of mental 
health problems and suicides (Mcdougall et al., 2015; Barr et al., 2016).
To reiterate: whatever the overall quantum of resources available to a government or oth­
er authoritative decision-maker, and keeping in mind that scarcity is seldom absolute in 
the sense that scarcities of rare earth elements or biologically compatible organ donors 
are absolute (Schrecker, 2013b), choices about public finance reflect assumptions or con­
clusions that some people’s lives matter more than others’ (Basu, Carney, and Kenworthy, 
2017), and about why they do. This point was brought home in June 2017, when at least 
seventy-nine people died in a horrific fire in a London social housing tower block (Gren­
fell Tower). At the time of this writing, investigations were ongoing, but the use of flam­
mable, and slightly less expensive, exterior cladding as a cost-cutting measure by con­
tractors undertaking a refurbishment for the responsible local council (in the ultra- 
wealthy borough of Kensington and Chelsea) appears to have been an important factor, in 
turn enabled by deregulation and a lack of resources for inspection and oversight (Kirk­
patrick, Hakim, and Glanz, 2017). It remains to be seen whether public revulsion in the 
aftermath will lead to changes in priorities. Furthermore, how that revulsion could be ar­
ticulated is unclear.
Public finance is a public health issue in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) as 
well. In a seeming turnaround from the legacy of structural adjustment conditionalities, 
universal health coverage (UHC) is now prominent on the global development policy 
agenda, and indeed is the topic of a target under the United Nations’ 2015 Sustainable 
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Development Goals. Although increases in development assistance will be indispensable 
in some countries, in many the most important prerequisite for progress toward UHC will 
be the ability to mobilize domestic resources more effectively through taxation (Centre on 
Global Health Security, 2014). This mobilization may not be politically attainable, as can 
be seen from the example of India—a conspicuous underachiever on (p. 845) health indica­
tors relative to economically comparable countries (Drèze and Sen, 2013), yet one where 
a newly elected government in 2015 opted to reduce an already minimal public sector 
health care budget (Mudur, 2015). A similar pattern can be seen on the African continent, 
where, more than a decade after a 2001 commitment by African Union member countries 
to raise health sector spending to 15 percent of the general government budget, many 
countries had made only modest progress (African Union, 2013). A recent World Health 
Organization analysis confirms this as a general pattern, finding a recent “overall deterio­
ration in the role of domestic public funds for health spending, especially in low-income 
countries” (Barroy et al., 2017, vi). Thus, the interface of public finance and public health 
ethics involves choices on the revenue side as well as the expenditure side. This brief de­
scription cannot do justice to the complexities of the domestic politics of health care fi­
nancing, but it underscores the central importance of a health ethics focus on public fi­
nance—at least unless one regards a state of affairs in which access to health care and 
the prerequisites for a healthy life is proportional to a household’s income or wealth as 
unproblematic.
In the international economic and political environment, the legacy of health systems 
weakened by structural adjustment has already been mentioned. A further problem, only 
recently recognized as consequential for health and health policy, involves the fiscally de­
bilitating effects of capital flight (Schrecker, 2014a) and tax avoidance, which along with 
the desire for higher and more secure returns on investment is one of the primary motiva­
tions for capital flight (Harrington, 2016; Cobham and Jansky, 2017; Cobham, 2017). 
Some of the magnitudes remain contested (Forstater, 2017), but it is now clear that these 
processes have drained and are draining many LMIC economies of resources that—at 
least under favorable domestic political conditions—could have been invested in health 
care systems, public health programming, and efforts to address social determinants of 
health (for a nontechnical overview in the African context, see Ndikumana and Boyce, 
2011).
An important caveat is in order at this point, given the increasing attention being paid to 
an approach usually described as “health in all” policies (WHO, 2015). The principle that 
public policy in areas that do not directly or obviously relate to health should be made 
with knowledge of the likely consequences for health (both positive and negative) is unex­
ceptionable. This does not, however, imply that policies with negative consequences for 
health, or health inequalities, should never be adopted. As Daniel Weinstock (2015) points 
out, public policy is unavoidably about trade-offs among competing priorities, and it is im­
possible to optimize for multiple values simultaneously except as a matter of serendipity. 
Accepting the value of health in all policies as an approach to policy analysis does not 
mandate prioritizing health in all policy fields. Norms limiting the permissible negative 
consequences for health can be derived not only from principles of distributive justice 
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(which admittedly represent contested terrain), but also from the norms embodied in in­
ternational human rights instruments, notably those related to core obligations, progres­
sive realization and non-retrogression (Schrecker, 2014b), but elaborating on these points 
would take us far beyond the scope and allowable length of this chapter.
(p. 846) The Corporate Role: “Vectors of Spread” 
for “Industrial Epidemics”?
Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) represent most of the burden of illness in the high-in­
come world, and their importance is rapidly increasing elsewhere. These are often inac­
curately thought of as diseases of affluence, “lifestyle,” or both (Ezzati et al., 2005; Glas­
gow and Schrecker, 2015). Alternatively, a political economy perspective foregrounds two 
specific phenomena. Socioeconomically patterned differences exist within societies in 
people’s opportunities to live healthy lives. Manifestations include the unaffordability of 
healthy diets and the way in which housing markets in some settings segregate people on 
low incomes into “food deserts” (Beaulac, Kristjansson, and Cummins, 2009; Walker, 
Keane, and Burke, 2010; Burns, 2014). Against this background, large, mainly transna­
tional corporations (TNCs) and their formidable investment, marketing, and lobbying re­
sources shape both the choices available to individuals and households and the trajectory 
of public policies that affect health. Focusing on this dimension of public health policy, 
Rob Moodie and colleagues (2013, 671) have argued that the rising burden of NCDs is 
best explained as a congeries of “industrial epidemics” in which “the vectors of spread 
are not biological agents, but transnational corporations” in the tobacco, food, and drinks 
industries.
Comparisons with the tobacco industry are both provocative and instructive. Tobacco 
TNCs based in the United States and the United Kingdom are now notorious for a history 
of efforts to obscure or distract from scientific evidence of harm, by means ranging from 
selective citation to straightforward fraud (Glantz et al., 1996). They have also lobbied ag­
gressively against public health measures, notably in expanding markets in LMICs (e.g., 
Egbe, Bialous, and Glantz, 2017; Boseley, 2017; Kalra et al., 2017a). Notably, recent years 
have also seen an intensification of the industry’s efforts to shape and use the provisions 
of trade and investment agreements to override requirements for plain packaging and 
warning labels (Fooks and Gilmore, 2014), on grounds related to lost revenues or expro­
priation of intellectual property (Russell, Wainwright, and Mamudu, 2015; Steele et al., 
2015; Eckhardt, Holden, and Callard, 2016; Roache, Gostin, and Bianco, 2016). Such ef­
forts have so far been largely unsuccessful, but defending against them, especially at the 
level of trade dispute resolution, requires substantial public sector resources. In such 
contexts, power asymmetries between TNCs and their acolytes and governments seeking 
to protect public health are especially marked—as they are with regard to the tobacco 
industry’s continued, well-resourced efforts to frustrate national implementation of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Kalra et al., 2017b).
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Public policy toward the tobacco industry has sometimes been characterized by what has 
been termed “tobacco exceptionalism,” but according to one leading tobacco policy re­
searcher, “there is little to suggest that the corporate strategies of alcohol or food corpo­
rations are inherently more conducive to positive health outcomes” (Collin, 2012, 277; 
(p. 847) see also Freudenberg, 2014, 37–69). The motor and fossil fuel industries should 
almost certainly be added to this list. The strategy of “manufacturing uncertainty” with 
respect to scientific evidence originated with the tobacco industry, but it has since been 
adopted by other industrial interests, with respect not only to environmental and work­
place exposures (Michaels and Monforton, 2005; Michaels, 2006; Davis, 2007, 296–434), 
but also to diet, perhaps most conspicuously with regard to the effects of dietary sugar, as 
documented in an important journalistic exposé (Taubes and Couzens, 2012). Even when 
such strategies are not deployed, the sheer value of resources that large corporations can 
devote to refining and marketing their products provides them with substantial, often un­
healthy, influence on consumption patterns (Moss, 2013). This is a global concern: as bar­
riers to trade and investment are lowered, rapid expansion of supermarket, ultra- 
processed food, and fast food TNCs into LMIC markets is having serious negative conse­
quences for dietary patterns (Popkin, Adair, and Ng, 2012; Popkin and Slining, 2013; Friel 
et al., 2013; Monteiro et al., 2013; Freudenberg, 2014, 153–178; Popkin, 2014, 2015; Pop­
kin and Hawkes, 2016). These portend a perfect storm in terms of future morbidity pat­
terns and health system costs related to such NCDs as cardiovascular disease and dia­
betes, in addition to the obvious direct human consequences.
Such patterns are problematic because, like the tobacco industry’s lobbying activities, 
they are a manifestation of the raw power of money to shape decisions that affect 
people’s lives and health. This is a larger problem in democratic theory, one of several at 
the interface of political theory and health ethics. In addition, industry strategies distort 
the content of public health policy discussions by miscasting them as discussions of the 
strength of scientific evidence—sometimes in highly disingenuous ways—rather than of 
the underlying values that should guide public health policy in a context where waiting 
for further evidence inescapably embodies a choice to value certain outcomes and inter­
ests over others, and public health policy must accept “the inevitability of being wrong” 
some of the time (Jellinek, 1981). Four decades of analysis on the importance of standards 
of proof (choices about how much evidence is enough) in environmental policy and law 
have had minimal impact elsewhere in the study of population health and public health 
ethics (Schrecker, 2013a).
Analysis: Ethics Meets Politics in Public Health 
—“Choice” for Whom? From What Menu? And 
Who Selects the Items on the Menu?
The political economy of health foregrounds multiple economically driven power asymme­
tries between transnational corporate actors and others. Some of us would go beyond a 
focus on transnational corporations to identify a transnational capitalist class (p. 848) (see 
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Sklair, 2005; Robinson, 2010; Carroll, 2014; Carroll and Sapinski, 2016, among many oth­
er sources), although the point is contested. The political economy of health thereby pro­
vides an important counterpoint to framings of public health ethics issues that focus on 
the extent to which policy measures represent (im)permissible restrictions on individual 
autonomy as manifested through consumer choice (about such matters as diet, consump­
tion of pleasurable substances, or mode of transport). Such framings are familiar from 
polemics against restrictions on corporate activities that invoke the idea of the “nanny 
state” (Magnusson, 2015), but are also evident in more subtle form in, for example, the 
“intervention ladder” devised by the UK’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics (Krebs et al., 
2007)—a device that fails to reflect many of the nuances correctly identified in the 
Nuffield report’s background discussion. Only two, related problems with such concep­
tions of choice can be identified here.
As Griffiths and West (2015, 1093) point out, the intervention ladder, organized as it is 
around a unidimensional conception of “liberty,” embodies the presumption “that no poli­
cy can do more to promote liberty than non-intervention.” A moment’s reflection on this 
proposition in other contexts—think for example about domestic violence—suffices to 
show its vacuity. The implicit presumption that there are only two categories of relevant 
actors, the state and the individual, ignores the complex policy landscape and the role of 
actors such as large corporations—as well as disparities in social and economic situation 
—that affect what choices are available to particular individuals. The implicit, and unde­
fended, presumption is that only state agencies are capable of choice-limiting actions or 
“coercion.” However, as noted in the lead author’s foreword to the Nuffield report: “It 
takes only a moment’s thought to recognize that many of the ‘choices’ that individuals 
make about their lifestyle are heavily constrained as a result of policies established by 
central and local government, by various industries as well as by various kinds of inequal­
ity in society” (Krebs et al., 2007, v). Ignoring these dimensions in discussions of choice 
and autonomy is intellectually irresponsible; if state decisions about public finance shape 
the options available to individuals in different life situations, so too do decisions made by 
large corporations about such matters as investment and product line characteristics (cf., 
Nadel, 1976). Further, state decisions articulate the scope that such actors have to oper­
ate independently of collectively agreed-upon restrictions. Indeed, discussion of contem­
porary public policy that ignores corporate influence is a bit “like Frankenstein with the 
monster left out” (Hacker, 1973, 173).
Further, as noted in the Nuffield foreword and the extensive literature on social determi­
nants of health, consumer choices are always constrained by a substrate of inequality. 
They are limited by purchasing power, which is unequally distributed, and other strati­
fiers related to socioeconomic position (as in the case of food deserts). Beyond this, pub­
lic health ethics must interact with political theory with regard to the distinction between 
individual choices and collective choices about the conditions in which we may want to 
live and work, which, at least in idealized democratic polities, we make together. Thus, 
given a particular set of circumstances and life chances, we might personally want to be 
able to smoke at our local pub or drive home after several beers, yet also favor eliminat­
ing that option out of concern for the health of those we care about (p. 849) who are fel­
The Political Economy of Public Health: Challenges for Ethics
Page 8 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 04 June 2020
low road users or are exposed to secondhand smoke during long shifts as servers. We 
may want to drive to work in a single-occupancy vehicle and bring fast food home for din­
ner on the return journey, yet at the same time we might prefer a set of social arrange­
ments that raised taxes to support functioning public transport, or at least vehicle shar­
ing, and local tax structures that would have offered preferential rates to now-defunct lo­
cal grocery stores offering healthy food choices.
The environmental law scholar Mark Sagoff (1981a, 1981b, 1981c) has made a homolo­
gous point using, as an illustration, the responses of students presented with a plan to de­
velop a ski resort in a wilderness area. By their own account, the students would proba­
bly never visit the wilderness area and were enthusiastic about the recreational opportu­
nities offered by the ski resort. Nevertheless, when asked whether the development pro­
posal should proceed, the students’ reaction “was unanimous, visceral and grim. All of 
the students believed that the Disney plan was loathsome and despicable; that the [US] 
Forest Service had violated a public trust by approving it; and that the values for which 
we stand as a nation compel us to preserve the little wilderness we have for its own sake 
and as an historical heritage” (Sagoff, 1981c, 284). The distinction in play is that between 
our preferences and values as consumers and as citizens; despite the best efforts of the 
acolytes of cost-benefit analysis and of public choice interpretations of political activity 
(MacLean, 2017), they are not reducible to one another.
Three Future Challenges
Political economy focuses on “upstream” influences on health—what Sir Michael Marmot, 
borrowing a phrase from Geoffrey Rose, calls “the causes of the causes” (Marmot, 2005). 
This formulation leaves open the question of how far upstream to look. In the Flint exam­
ple that began the chapter, is it sufficient to examine the proximal political choices that 
led to the poisoning of this relatively vulnerable population—which have led to criminal 
charges against senior public officials (Glenza, 2017)—or is it necessary, as suggested in 
the introduction, to consider such structural issues as systemic racism, the nature and 
sources of pressures to shrink public budgets, and even the mechanisms by which rev­
enues to support public services are raised? The author leans strongly in this latter direc­
tion, while recognizing that in many cases the “how far upstream” choice represents what 
Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Earl McCoy (1993, 84) refer to as methodological value 
judgments. Sometimes, however, the line between such judgments and scientific or ex­
planatory incompleteness is blurred. Thus, in a critique of studies of neighborhood effects 
on life chances, the geographer Tom Slater (2013, 369) questioned the presumption that 
causal pathways run from residential location to such outcomes as escaping poverty 
rather than in the opposite direction: “If where any given individual lives affects their life 
chances as deeply as neighborhood effects proponents believe, it seems crucial to under­
stand why that individual is living there in the first place.” This means inquiring into such 
variables as influences on the distribution of (p. 850) income, and such processes as the 
socio-spatial sorting function performed by housing markets. It was not the white middle 
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class that inhabited New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward, the community most devastated by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and least benefited by subsequent reconstruction efforts.
Such questions assume increasing importance against a background of rising inequality, 
in countries rich and poor alike (Bourguignon, 2015), often magnified rather than attenu­
ated by policy choices. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative prime minister David 
Cameron (2009) (in)famously claimed that his government’s approach to austerity would 
embody the principle that “we’re all in this together”—a claim that was decisively refuted 
at the end of his first term by analysis of cumulative budget impacts (De Agostini, Hills, 
and Sutherland, 2015). Presciently, the editor of New Perspectives Quarterly observed in 
1993 that “[a]lready people merely surviving in places like Bangladesh and across vast 
stretches of Africa are superfluous from the standpoint of the market. By and large, we 
don’t need what they have; they can’t buy what we sell”; from a public health perspec­
tive, the epidemiological worlds inhabited by these populations are in most important as­
pects completely different from “the archipelago of the connected classes that reside in 
every megacity from Bombay to São Paulo” (Gardels, 1993, 3). Even within high-income 
countries, barriers to replicating the “cross-class political alliance” that the historian Si­
mon Szreter (1999) sees as having driven public health policy advances in nineteenth- 
century England in today’s contexts are often formidable.
This is partly because, as production and finance have been reorganized across multiple 
national borders over the past few decades, distributional conflicts can no longer be con­
tained and need not be resolved within national borders—a necessary precondition for 
settlements between labor and capital in the high-income world, many of which are now 
unravelling, and one reason among several to doubt that the politics of the future will be 
like those of the postwar past. Much ethical and policy analysis related to public health 
operates on the implicit and decontextualized assumption that some form, albeit rudimen­
tary, of social contract exists between rulers and subjects. We assume that governments 
can be expected to care at least a little bit about the welfare of people within their nation­
al borders. However, serious consideration of the changes in social structure associated 
with contemporary globalization raises the prospect that even in formal democratic juris­
dictions, governments and political elites may simply not care about the welfare of a sub­
stantial portion of their compatriots, whose command of political resources is minimal. 
Again, the example of Hurricane Katrina is instructive (see Hartman and Squires, 2006; 
Somers, 2008, 63–117).
An additional layer of complexity is introduced by the spread of “illiberal 
democracy” (Zakaria, 1997)—the breakdown of political accountability and the rule of 
law, and the simultaneous spread of authoritarianism. A founding editor of the Journal of 
Democracy has described what he calls a “democratic recession” post-2006, a turning 
point identified by Freedom House, with particular focus on “a class of regimes that in 
the last decade or so have experienced significant erosion in electoral fairness, political 
pluralism, and civic space for opposition and dissent, typically as a result of abusive exec­
utives intent upon concentrating their personal power and entrenching ruling-party 
hegemony” (Diamond, 2015). One need not look further than the lead stories of any rep­
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utable news (p. 851) outlet. In a growing range of contexts, it is problematic, if not fatal, 
for subjects to advocate for protecting their own health and to attempt to mobilize the po­
litical coalitions that drove earlier advances in public health—as shown, for example, by 
the work of Global Witness (2017) on the killings of activists organizing against environ­
mental destruction. Public health ethics must come to grips with this reality, as with oth­
ers, by engaging with the relevant social science, and with the relevant protagonists “on 
the ground.”
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